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THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE AFTER FERGUSON
CHARlESTON
I.

v. CITY OF

INTRODUCTION

States have the burden of keeping the public safe, while at the same
time, respecting individuals' privacy rights. The Founding Fathers
recognized these competing interests and created the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution to impose limits on the state's intrusion into
. private life. To protect individuals' privacy rights, the Founding Fathers wrote in the Fourth Amendment that "no [w]arrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause."l However, the Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized exceptions to this general rule requiring
probable cause to conduct a search. 2 Under certain circumstances,
such as the need to keep drugs out of schools;3 the effective implementation of a probation system;4 or the need to keep illicit drug
users from operating dangerous vehicles, 5 special needs justifY a departure from the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. 6
This exception is called the special needs doctrine. 7
Since New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court has recognized a special needs exception to the probable cause requirement imposed by
the Fourth Amendment. 8 Essentially, this exception recognizes that a
state's "special needs" justifY a search predicated on less than the
Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement when the objective
serves "non-law enforcement ends."g To determine whether such a
search is reasonable, the interests of the government must be balanced against the individual's privacy interests. 1O
Recently, the Supreme Court discussed the special needs doctrine
in Ferguson v. City of Charleston. I l In Ferguson, the Medical University of
South Carolina (MUSC) , a state hospital, tested pregnant women for
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See infra Part II.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987).
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,620 (1989).
See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873
(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun,j., concurring)).
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, j., concurring).
Id. (Blackmun, J., Concurring).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 (2001).
Id. at 74 n.7 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53
(1995); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720
(1987) (plurality opinion); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351.
532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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cocaine use without their knowledge. I2 Women who tested positive
for cocaine use were charged with criminal child abuse. 13 The Court
ruled that MUSe's drug testing program violated the women's Fourth
Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure. 14 The majority reasoned that because the hospital worked
with the police during the testing period, and threatened criminal
prosecution, the "immediate objective" of the drug testing program
was to "generate evidence for law enforcement purposes."15 Accordingly, MUSC's drug testing policy did not fit into the category of the
"special needs" doctrine. 16
Notwithstanding Ferguson, the special needs doctrine has been characterized as inconsistent. I7 Ferguson adds to the confusion because it
is the first decision to focus on a program's immediate objective,
rather than its ultimate objective. IS This approach is contrary to prior
case law and raises questions as to whether the state may use ordinary
law enforcement techniques when it is pursuing special needs beyond
the scope of ordinary law enforcement.
This Comment proposes that courts should look to the ultimate
purpose, rather than the immediate objective of the program. 19 Furthermore, the courts should not invalidate a special needs program
simply because it involves an element of law enforcement. Rather, the
courts should determine whether law enforcement is an incidental,
rather than integral, part of the special needs program. 20
In Part II, this Comment examines the development of the special
needs doctrine and the unresolved questions regarding the doctrine's
scope and use. Part III attempts to answer these questions by first ana12. Id. at 70-73.
13. Under South Carolina law, a viable fetus is considered a person, particularly in cases where the mother ingests cocaine. Id. n.2. In such a case,
South Carolina's Supreme Court has held that ingesting cocaine during the
third trimester constitutes criminal child neglect. Id. (citing Whitner v.
South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1995), cm denied, 523 U.S. 1145
(1998». If the pregnancy was 27 weeks or less, the patient was to be
charged with simple possession. Ferg;uson, 532 U.S. at 72. If a woman "delivered 'while testing positive for illegal drugs,' she was also to be charged
with unlawful neglect of a child." Id. at 72-73.
14. See id. at 84.
15. Id. at 83.
16. Id. at 84.
17. See generallyJennifer E. Smiley, Rethinking The "Special Needs" Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School Students and the Narrowing of
Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 811, 826-28 (2001) (discussing several other inconsistencies in the special needs doctrine and how
it has led to confusion in the lower courts); Sean Anderson, Individual Privacy Interests and the "Special Needs" Analysis for Involuntary Drug and HIV Tests,
86 CAL. L. REv. 119, 147-48 (1998) (discussing inconsistency among lower
courts when applying the special needs doctrine).
18. See infra Parts II and III.C.3.
19. See infra Part III.C.3.
20. See infra Part III.C.4.
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lyzing the types of state interests that fall under the special needs doctrine. Furthermore, Part III examines when and how normal law
enforcement techniques, such as arrest and prosecution, may be used
in the implementation of a special needs search policy. Finally, Part
IV summarizes the proposed answers to the unresolved questions setting forth criteria under which to determine whether a less-than-probable-cause search falls under the special needs doctrine.

II.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINE

A.

Balancing the Public Interest Against Privacy Interests

The Fourth Amendment states "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause."21 This does not require, however, that
all searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable
cause. As the court wrote in Camara v. Municipal Court, "reasonableness
is ... the ultimate standard" for determining whether a search is conducted in a manner that violates the Fourth Amendment. 22 As the
Supreme Court stated in Camara, "[u]nfortunately, there can be no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails."23 In
balancing the need to search against the invasion of an individual's
privacy rights, the Supreme Court has held that a search predicated
on less than probable cause, or without a warrant, may still be deemed
constitutional " [when] special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable. "24
This is the paradigm in which special needs cases are decided. The
Court must determine whether, given the compelling nature of particular societal needs, it would be "impracticable" to require authorities
to adhere to the probable cause-warrant requirement. 25 This is not a
static test; rather, it requires that the courts determine whether, given
the competing interests at stake, the public interest is best served by a
reasonableness standard that falls short of the probable cause-warrant
requirement. 26 The outcome is fact-sensitive, and as illustrated below,
the Court has reached varied conclusions given the varied interests at
stake. 27
2l. u.s. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
22. 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (emphasis added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1,9 (1968).
23. 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
24. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, j., concurring).
25. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
26. See id. at 34l.
27. See infra Parts H.B-E.
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New Jersey v. T.L.O.

In New Jersey v. T.L. 0., a high school freshman was caught smoking
cigarettes in the girls' lavatory.28 Mter being taken to the principal's
office, T.L.O. denied smoking cigarettes, and the assistant vice principal demanded to see her purse. 29 The assistant vice principal found a
pack of cigarettes and a package of cigarette rolling papers commonly
used to roll marijuana cigarettes. 30 The assistant vice principal continued to search the purse and found marijuana, paraphernalia, and evidence that T.L.O. was dealing to other students. 31 T.L.O. was
suspended,32 and the state brought delinquency charges against her
in Juvenile Court. 33
The Supreme Court held that searching T.L.O.'s purse for marijuana did not violate the student's Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, even though the
principal's search was based only on reasonable suspicion. 34 The majority opined that" [w] here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."35
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with using the
balancing test to determine whether a search based on less-than-probable-cause is reasonable. 36 However, Justice Blackmun said that the
balancing test should only be used when a court is confronted with "a
special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."37 Justice Blackmun opined that" [0] nly in those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 329 n.1.
1~L.O., 469 U.S. at 325.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 341. The Court also gave an extensive list of cases where it adopted a
standard that is lower than probable cause. Id. This illustrates that the less
- than - probable - cause requirement is not novel to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See id; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (holding warrantless border searches at routine checkpoints are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding that
"[a police officer] is entitled to the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him"); Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (holding a warrantless search as part of a
municipal housing inspection program reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment) .
36. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun,j., concurring).
37. Id. (quoting Florida v. Roger, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, j.,
dissenting) ).
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entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers."38
When analyzing subsequent special needs cases, the Supreme Court
adopted Justice Blackrnun's balancing approach. 39 His concurring
opinion became the foundation for the special needs doctrine. 4o
C.

Subsequent Special Needs Developments

Two years after New Jersey v. T.L. 0., the Supreme Court used Justice
Blackrnun's special needs balancing test to decide Griffin v. Wisconsin.41 In Griffin, the defendant, a convicted felon, was placed on probation after being found guilty of disorderly conduct and other
related charges. 42 While Griffin was on probation, his probation officer received information from a detective that Griffin may have guns
in his apartment. 43 Under the authority of an administrative regulation,44 the probation officers searched Griffin's apartment and found
a handgun. 45 Griffin was charged and convicted of being a felon in
possession of a handgun. 46 The Court upheld the search predicated
on "reasonable grounds," rather than the stricter probable cause
standard. 47
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that operating a probation system, like a school or other state institution, "presents 'special
needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures
from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."48 Mter
concluding that a probation system is a special need of the state, the
Court balanced the probationer's diminished expectation of privacy49
against the state's need to successfully operate a probation system. 50
38. Id.
39.
40.
4l.
42.

43.
44.

45.
46.

See, e.g., Ferguson 532 U.S. at 72 n.7.
See id.
See 483 U.S. at 873-74; see infra text accompanying notes 49-52.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870.
Id. at 87l.
Id. at 870-71 (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ 328.16(1), 328.21(4) (1981)).
These administrative regulations allowed probation officers to search probationers' homes without a warrant so long as a supervisor approved the
search, and the search was predicated on "reasonable grounds" for believing the probationer may be in possession of contraband. Id.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 87l.
Id. at 872.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 873-74.
49. The majority focused on the fact that probation falls on the spectrum of
criminal punishment, and, therefore, probationers have more restricted
liberty and a more diminished expectation of privacy than the average citizen. Id. at 874. Justice Blackmun, the first justice to articulate the special
needs doctrine, actually dissented in this opinion because he disagreed that
probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy in their homes. !d.
at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 876-77.
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The Court concluded that it is too impracticable to require a magistrate-issued warrant based on probable cause to search a probationer's
home. 51
Two years after Griffin, the Supreme Court decided Skinner v. Railway Executives' Assn. 52 and Union National Treasury Employees v. Von
Raab. 53 In Skinner, the United States Department of Transportation,
under the authority of the Federal Railroad Act,54 tested all on-duty
employees, who were involved in an "impact accident," for drug or
alcohol use. 55 The Court borrowed language from Griffin and concluded that
The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a
government office, school, or prison, "likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify
departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements. "56
Additionally, the Court noted that the purpose of the drug testing was
to prevent railway accidents and casualties, and not to prosecute the
railwayemployees. 57
In Von Raab, the United States Customs Service implemented a policy that required all employees applying for a promotion to pass a
drug test. 58 It is important to note that if an employee tested positive
for drug use, the employee was subject to immediate dismissal from
the Customs Service; however, the results would not be forwarded to
any agency for prosecution without the written consent of the employee. 59 The employee's union filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the
program violated the Fourth Amendment rights of employees seeking
promotions. 60
The Supreme Court held that the state has a substantial need to
ensure that employees in sensitive positions, such as customs officers,
51. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77. Justice Scalia analogized requiring warrants
to search probationers' homes with that of requiring parents to obtain warrants to search a minor child's room. See id. Justice Scalia compared the
probation officer to a parent and wrote: "[a probation officer] is an employee of the State Department of Health and Social Services who, while
assuredly charged with protecting the public interest, is also supposed to
have in mind the welfare of the probationer." Id. at 876.
52. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
53. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
54. 45 U.S.c. § 431 (a) (repealed 1994).
55. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609.
56. Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 - 74).
57. Id. at 620-21 (citing 49 CFR § 219.9 (1987».
58. See 489 U.S. at 660.
59. Id. at 663.
60. Id.
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are not using illegal drugs. 61 The Court also reasoned that because
employees who tested positive were not subject to prosecution, the
drug testing program was designed to serve the state's needs beyond
ordinary law enforcement. 62 Therefore, the Court balanced the
state's special need against the customs officers' privacy rights and
concluded that the need outweighed the customs officers' privacy interests. 63 The Court reasoned that the program utilized several safeguards to minimize the intrusion into the employee's privacy
interests. 64 Requiring the Customs Service to obtain search warrants
based on probable cause would interfere with the its mission. 65 The
Court also generalized that requiring the government to obtain a warrant for every work-related intrusion would severely impair its governmental function because every employee matter would become a
constitutional concern. 66
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Vernonia School District 47] v.
Acton. 67 In Acton, an Oregon school district implemented a policy of
randomly testing student athletes for drug use. 68 The school targeted
student athletes because of their status as role models for the other
students, and the faculty believed that student athletes were behind
the sudden increase in drug use at the high schoo1. 69 If a student
tested positive for drug use more than once, he or she had the option
of enrolling in a six week program. 70 If a student refused to obtain
treatment, he or she would be suspended from playing on student
athletic teams. 71
James Acton, a seventh grader in the Vernonia School District, was
denied a place on the football team because his parents refused to
sign the test consent form that was required to be eligible for student
athletics. 72 The Actons filed suit asking for declaratory and injunctive
relief on the grounds that the drug testing policy violated Actons'
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.

66.
67.
68.

69.

70.
71.

72.

Id. at 666.
Id.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
See id. at 672 n.2 (noting that the Custom SeIVice's drug testing program
only tested for specific drugs, and that employees were not required to disclose any medical information unless the employee tested positive for such
specified drug use).
See id. at 666-67. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, opined that
"[t]he Customs Service has been entrusted with pressing responsibilities,
and its mission would be compromised if it were required to seek search
warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment decisions."
Id. at 667.
See id. at 666.
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Id. at 648.
See id. at 648-49.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id.
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 73 The Supreme Court
held the drug testing policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 74
The Court held that although prior cases such as Skinner and Von
Raab characterize the state's special need as "compelling," courts
should not view this as a fixed standard. 75 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, held that state interest must be important enough to justify
the search. 76 Whether the school district's sudden increase in student
drug use constituted a compelling governmental interest was irrelevant. The Court held that the interest was important enough to justify
the random drug testing. 77 The Court also balanced the nature of the
intrusion and the diminished expectation of privacy of students, particularly when they voluntarily try out for athletics, and concluded that
the random drug testing was reasonable, and therefore
constitutional. 78
The first time the Supreme Court did not uphold a special needs
search was in Chandler v. Miller. 79 The Court found a Georgia law requiring political candidates to take drug tests to be an unreasonable
search, and thus, violated the Fourth Amendment. 80 A group of libertarian party candidates brought suit on the grounds that the Georgia
law violated their First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 81
The Court agreed with the candidates and ruled that, "Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test ... does not
fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible
suspicion less searches."82
The Court, per Justice Ginsburg, held that the state failed to show a
special substantial need that is important enough to override the individual's privacy interest and depart from the Fourth Amendment's
normal requirement of probable cause and individual suspicion. 83
The majority reasoned that the state did not demonstrate that the statute was enacted as a result of fear or suspicion that state officials were
involved in illegal drug use, or any other articulable concrete danger. 84
The statute was merely enacted under the belief that drug use is not
compatible with holding public office. 85 This is the first time the
73. Acton, 515 U.S. at 651.
74. [d. at 664-65.
75. [d. at 661.
76. [d.

77. [d.
78. [d. at 664-65.
79. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
80. See id. at 323.
81. [d. at 310.
82. [d. at 309.
83. See id. at 320.
84. See id. at 321-22.
85. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322. The Court characterized the need to test
political candidates for drug use as being "symbolic," opposed to "special."
[d.
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Court required the state to show an actual, rather than abstract, danger that required a departure from the traditional probable cause warrant standard of the Fourth Amendment. 86
D.

Ferguson v. City of Charleston

The Supreme Court revisited the special needs doctrine in Ferguson
v. City of Charleston. 87 In this case, a public hospital, The Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), became concerned with an alarming increase in the number of pregnant patients abusing cocaine. 88
The hospital had previously adopted a policy of testing patients' urine
who were suspected of using cocaine. 89 The hospital was also referring patients who tested positive to counseling and treatment. 90 Despite counseling and treatment, however, cocaine use did not
recede. 91
Unhappy with the results from counseling and treatment, MUSC's
general counsel made arrangements to refer the pregnant patients
who tested positive for cocaine use to the City Solicitor for prosecution. 92 The patients were never told that they were being tested for
cocaine use. 93 Initially, the policy was to refer any positive test result
to the City Solicitor for prosecution, but the policy was later modified
to forward test results to the City Solicitor for prosecution only if the
patient failed to comply with drug treatment recommendations. 94
In a divided opinion,95 the Supreme Court held that testing the
pregnant women for cocaine use without their knowledge,96 and pros86. See generally Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomizing jurisprudence:
Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REv. 258, 271 (2000) (giving
an in-depth history of special needs case law, prior to Ferguson, and discussing the impact of Chandler).
87. 532 U.S. at 78-79.
88. Id. at 70.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 70-71. South Carolina law recognizes a viable fetus as a person. Id.
at 70 n.2. Accordingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that ingesting cocaine during the third trimester constituted criminal child neglect. Id.
93. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76.
94. Id. at 72.
95. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority, which also included Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Souter. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas dissented. Id. at 69.
96. There was some debate about whether the patients consented to the drug
tests. Justice Scalia argued that the patients consented to the search by
voluntarily giving their urine specimens to the hospital. Ferguson, 532 U.S.
at 93-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reasoned that the patients
voluntarily entrusted their evidence to the hospital, and the Fourth Amendment does not protect persons who have a mistaken belief that the confidant can be trusted with the evidence. Id. at 94. Chief Justice Rehnquist
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ecuting them for child neglect, did not fit within the special needs
doctrine, and violated the women's Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. 97 The majority reasoned
that although the ultimate goal of the program may have been to protect the health of the fetuses and get pregnant mothers off drugs, the
immediate objective of the testing was to generate evidence for prosecution. 98 The majority focused on the extensive law enforcement involvement at every stage of the process. 99 The majority also
emphasized that law enforcement always serves a broader goal, and
any suspicionless search could be upheld under the special needs doctrine by analyzing the search in terms of the ultimate social objective
of law enforcement. lOO
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but disagreed with the majority's use of the immediate objective approach. lOI Justice Kennedy
argued that that the distinction the majority makes between the ultimate goal of the program and its immediate objective is inconsistent
with prior special ne~ds case law. 102 For example, using this analysis,
the majority would have concluded that the goal of the Vernonia
School District in Acton was to collect evidence of drug use, rather
than deterring drug use among school children. 103
Despite disagreement with the majority's reasoning, Justice Kennedy believed this case fell outside the scope of the special needs doctrine because of the extensive police involvement from the program's
inception. 104 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the hospital became an
"institutional arm of law enforcement," and the program had a "penal
character with a far greater connection to law enforcement than other
searches sustained under [the Court's] special needs rationale."105
Justice Scalia's dissent, as a preliminary matter, opined that the
drug testing was a search within the scope of the Fourth Amend-

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

103.

104.
105.

and Justice Thomas did not concur in this portion of the dissent. The majority left this question of consent to the lower courts because it was not
raised in the Court of Appeals of the United States. Id. at 77 n.ll.
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 84.
See id. at 86 (Kennedy,j., concurring).
Id. at 87.
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87(Kennedy,j., concurring). Justice Kennedy also
used the example of the Von Raab cases. Kennedy argued that had the
Court adopted this approach in deciding the Von Raab and Skinner case, the
Court would have concluded that the state's goal was to collect evidence of
drug use, rather than prevent the promotion of drug users to sensitive positions, or prevent drug users from operating locomotives, respectively. Id.
(Kennedy, j., concurring). In both cases, the Court looked to the ultimate
goal of the program. Id. (Kennedy, j., concurring).
See id. (Kennedy,j., concurring).
See id. at 88-89. (Kennedy, j., concurring).
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ment. 106 Justice Scalia analogized the urine with abandoned property
and pointed out that the Fourth Amendment does not protect abandoned property.107 The other dissenting justices did not concur in
this portion of the dissent.
Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the hospital's program had a
goal of improving the health of the mother and unborn child. lOB In
fact, the hospital had already been testing women for cocaine use
before it began turning over the results to prosecutors.109 The dissent
found it "incredible" that using the test results to compel patients into
treatment, the ultimate goal of the program, becomes a pretext for
obtaining evidence for prosecution. lIO Additionally, the dissent argued that adding law enforcement to a special need does not destroy
the applicability of the special needs doctrine. I I I
E.

Unresolved Questions

In light of Ferguson and other cases applying the special needs doctrine, several of the most important questions are unresolved. First,
does the involvement of law enforcement techniques, e.g., arrest and
prosecution, remove an otherwise special need of the state from the
boundaries of the special needs doctrine? Secondly, should courts
look to the special needs program's immediate objective, its ultimate
objective, or both? The proceeding section will show that normal law
enforcement techniques do not necessarily void an otherwise valid
special needs program. 1I2 Finally, based on the case law as a whole,
courts should look to the program's ultimate goal, rather than its immediate objectiveY3
III.
A.

ANAJL),SIS
Overview

This section first addresses the types of state special needs interests
that fall under the special needs doctrine. It also attempts to answer
the unresolved questions raised with the majority opinion in
Ferguson. I 14
lO6. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 92 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
107. See id. at 93. Maryland has also adopted this view. See Venner v. State, 30
Md. App. 599, 626-27, 354 A.2d 483, 498-99 (1978) (holding that a person
has no property rights in discarded human waste).
108. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 99 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
109. [d. at 99 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
110. [d. at 99-100 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
111. [d. at 100 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
112. See infra Part I1I.C.2.
113. See infra Part I1I.C.3.
114. See supra Part II.E.
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B.

Defining the Special Need

1.

Generally

[Vol. 32

The Supreme Court has never given clear guidance to the courts to
help identify what types of state interests fall under the special needs
doctrine. The only clear criterion is that the state interest must go
beyond the scope of ordinary law enforcement interests. I 15 However,
several cases allow courts to make several other generalizations. 116

2.

The Interest Must Be Important, Not Compelling

In Acton, 117 Justice Scalia's majority opinion clarified the standard
previously articulated in Skinner and Von Raab. Skinner and Von Raab
both held that the respective natures of the governmental interests at
stake were "compelling."118 Justice Scalia wrote that although previous special needs cases have characterized the state interest as "compelling," it is a mistake to think of this as a fixed standard. 119 Instead,
Justice Scalia wrote that the interest must merely be "imponant enough"
to justify the search at hand. 120
On its face, this analysis seems to side-step the first stage of special
needs analysis. Traditionally, the Court has first focused on the compelling state interest that goes beyond normal law enforcement and
proceeded with balancing the interests of the state versus the intrusion on the individual's privacy interests. 121 Acton, however, did not
involve a program where students were subjected to arrest and prosecution. 122 Because it was clear that the program was not intended for
ordinary law enforcement, the only issue was the importance of the
state need. 123 Therefore, Acton tells us that the first prong of the spe115. See, e.g., Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79. This requirement is of little assistance
given the Court's recent distinction in Ferguson between the intermediate
objective and ultimate goal. As discussed above, the Court's distinction between the intermediate purpose and ultimate goal of the special needs program makes it difficult to determine when a state's interest goes beyond the
scope of ordinary law enforcement. See infra Part II.A.
116. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313-14; Acton, 515 U.S. at 660-61; Griffin, 483 U.S. at
873-74; see infra Parts III.B.2-5.
117. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
118. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 (holding that the government's interest in collecting and testing locomotive operators for drug use without individualized suspicion was compelling); see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (holding
that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring that customs
agents, as one of the front lines of drug interdiction, were not drug users
themselves).
119. Acton, 515 U.S. at 66l.
120. Id. Justice Scalia held that simply determining whether deterring drug use
in public schools is a compelling interest is irrelevant. Id. However, he reasoned that deterring drug use in pubic schools is at least as important as the
state interests in Skinner and Von Raab. Id.; see also supra note 114.
12l. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
122. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
123. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653.
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cial needs analysis requires that the state pursue an important interest
beyond the scope of law enforcement. 124 The second prong requires
the court to weigh the important state interest against the individuals'
interests to determine if the search is reasonable. 125

3.

The Danger Must Be Concrete or Imminent

Another characteristic of a special need is that the danger must be
concrete. In Chandler v. Miller, the Court ruled that a law requiring
political candidates to pass a drug test was not based on any particular
suspicion that drug abuse was a problem among state office holders.126 The Court reasoned that absent any actual danger, there was
no special need to conduct suspicionless drug testing. 127 Given these
circumstances, the Court ruled that the testing was a symbolic need,
rather than a special need. 128
The requirement that the state's special need must be to correct an
actual, present danger is consistent with prior opinions. 129 The majority in Chandler, however, had to distinguish the present suspicionless
drug policy from the suspicionless drug testing policy in Von Raab. 130
The Court devoted a large part of its opinion distinguishing the two
cases. The Court distinguished Von Raab from Chandler because, although there was no documented evidence of a drug abuse problem
among customs agents, there was an inevitable danger arising from
customs agents abusing drugs. 131 Therefore, the state had a compelling interest in preventing or deterring such abuse. 132 In Chandler, the
state failed to show that political candidates' drug use created a compelling, inevitable danger. 133 Therefore, the Court seems to adopt
124.
125.
126.
127.

128.
129.

130.

131.
132.

133.

Id.
Id. at 652-53.
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
See id. at 318-19. The Court also focused on the fact that there was no
surprise as to when the drug testing would take place, rendering the program even less effective in promoting a special need, because candidates
could temporarily stop using illicit drugs in order to pass the drug test. Id.
at 319-20.
/d. at 322.
See generally Acton, 515 U.S. at 648-49 (noting that there was a significant
increase in student drug use and rebellion); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631 (noting that the policy of drug testing after train collisions was adopted in response to evidence of alcohol and drug abuse by employees, and the fact
that collisions are linked to drug impaired employees).
See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. In Von Raab, there was no
indication that Customs Service employees were abusing drugs, or creating
any similar danger at the time the program was implemented. Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 660 (noting that the Customs Service was "largely drug free").
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 315-16.
Id. The Court reasoned that customs agents were on the front line of drug
interdiction and needed to carry weapons as part of their duty. Id. at 316.
Given the nature of their position and mission of the Customs Service, putting a drug user in such a position would pose great danger. [d.
[d. at 318-19.
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the rule that the state must show an actual, present threat. I34 In the
absence of a present threat, the state must show that inevitable danger
would ensue if a potential threat materializes. I35

4.

Situations Where the Court Will Likely Uphold a Search Policy
Under the Special Needs Doctrine

It is clear that state interests fall under the special needs doctrine
when the state is operating public institutions such as schools. T.L. 0.
and Acton emphasize the state's special need to maintain safe functioning schools. I36 Similarly, the Court recognized that a state has a
special need to effectively operate a probation system. In Griffin v.
Wisconsin, the Court stated that "[a] State's operation of a probation
system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or
its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs'
beyond normal law enforcement that may justifY departures from the
usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."137 Therefore, it can
be concluded that a state's need falls under the special needs doctrine
when the search is conducted pursuant to the operation of a public
institution. 138
Courts have consistently recognized that the state has a special need
to operate its sensitive agencies according to their mission, particularly when public safety could be jeopardized. For example, in Von
Raab, the Court upheld the suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs
agents. I39 In addition. the Court ruled that the U.S. Customs Service
has been entrusted with pressing responsibilities and "[the Customs
Service] mission would be compromised if it were required to seek
search warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment
decisions."I4o The Court also noted that requiring every government
agency to obtain a warrant based on probable cause would impair its
function because every employment issue would rise to the level of a
constitutional concern.l4I

134. [d. at 318-22.
135. See id. at 320-23.
136. See generally Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (focusing on the custodial relationship between school authorities and students and the importance of school officials creating a nurturing environment); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (noting the
important interest of the school administrators in maintaining an environment where learning can take place).
137. See id. at 873-74.
138. See generally id. at 875-76.
139. See generally Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; see also supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
140. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667.
141. See id. at 666.
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Summary

When trying to determine if a state's need is special, it is useful to
look at: (1) whether the need serves a purpose other than ordinary
law enforcement; (2) whether the need is important; and (3) whether
the state's need is in response to an actual threat, or whether imminent danger would ensue if a potential threat materialized. Additionally, the existing body of law shows that the Supreme Court is likely to
uphold a special needs case when a state is operating a public institution or agency.142
C.

W'hen and How Much Law Enforcement Can Be Involved in the Implementation of a Special Needs Program?

1.

The Unresolved Question

The unresolved question arising from the scope of the special needs
doctrine is whether employing ordinary law enforcement methods
such as arrest and prosecution in a special needs search renders it
unconstitutional. As Ferguson demonstrates, the Court is divided. 143
Based on the case law as a whole, however, ordinary law enforcement
techniques such as arrest and prosecution do not necessarily render a
special needs search unconstitutional. 144

2.

Law Enforcement and Special Needs Searches Before Ferguson Do
Not Hold that the Presence of Law Enforcement Renders a Special Needs Search Unconstitutional.

The first case to hold that the state could depart from the Fourth
Amendment probable cause requirement when pursuing a special interest was New Jersey v. T.L.O. 145 In T.L.D., a principal searched ajuvenile student's purse [predicated only on reasonable suspicion] and
found marijuana. 146 When the contraband was found, school officials
notified the police. 147 T.L.O. was suspended from school, and the
state brought delinquency charges against her in juvenile court. 148
The police involvement and juvenile court proceedings were not an
issue in the case. Admittedly, juvenile proceedings are not
142. See, e.g., id. at 656 (upholding a special needs search of U.S. Customs Service agents); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868 (upholding a special needs search in
the context of the operation of a state's probation system); T.L.D., 469 U.S.
at 325 (upholding a special needs search in a school setting).
143. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67. In Ferguson, the majority included justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter. justice Kennedy filed a concurring
opinion. Chief justice Rehnquist, and justices Thomas and Scalia dissented.ld.
144. See infra Part III.C.2.
145. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
146. See supra Part H.B for a more detailed discussion of the facts.
147. T.L.D., 469 U.S. at 328.
148. !d. at 329.
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prosecutorial in nature, and this may have had some bearing on the
case. Nonetheless, the state utilized the police and courts in pursuing
the school's special need to operate safe and effective public schools.
In Griffin, the Court upheld another special needs search by state
probation officers of a probationer's home. 149 In Griffin, probation
officers found a handgun in Griffin's home, and Griffin, a convicted
felon, was charged and convicted of being a felon in possession of a
handgun. 15o This case is a clear example of the Court upholding a
special needs case that utilized normal law enforcement techniques.
Griffin was charged and convicted of a felony and sent to prison as a
result of a special needs search predicated only on reasonable
suspicion. 151
In Griffin, the Court held that the state's actions fell under the special need to operate an effective probation system. 152 The dissent disagreed with the majority's use of the balancing test as a substitution
for the warrant requirement. 153 The dissent never argued that the
presence of law enforcement invalidates an otherwise legitimate special needs search. 154
In Von Raab, the Customs agents' drug test results were not disclosed to the police without the agents' written consent. I55 Positive
test results could, however, lead to termination from the Customs Service if the agent could not offer any explanation for testing positive. 156
The fact that dismissed Customs agents were not prosecuted, facially
supports the proposition that arrest and prosecution cannot be an element of a special needs search program. Unlike T.L.O. and Griffin,
however, absent any possession or proof of being under the influence
while performing his or her duties, it is questionable whether there
would be any crime with which to charge the agent. I57 The other
cases involve clear instances where the individual is in possession of
contraband,158 which clearly violates a criminal law. This is a significant distinction between Von Raab and other cases such as T.L.O. and
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868; see also supra Part II.B.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872.
[d.
See id. at 875-76.
See id. at 881-82. Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, wrote:
My application of the balancing test leads me to conclude that speciallaw enforcement needs justify a search by a probation agent of
the home of a probationer on the basis of a reduced level of suspicion. The acknowledged need for supervision, however, does not
also justify an exception to the warrant requirement, and I would
retain this means of protecting a probationer's privacy.
[d. at 882.
See id. at 881-90.
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663.
[d.
Compare Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 and T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, with Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656.
See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871-72; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
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Griffin where the individuals in possession of contraband were
prosecuted. 159
In Skinner, there was some question as to whether the system set in
place by the Department of Transportation allowed the test results to
be turned over to authorities for prosecution. 160 The Court made it
clear that it thought the drug testing was not a pretext for obtaining
evidence, but did not decide whether the use of law enforcement
would "impugn" the administrative nature of the program. 161
Likewise, in Michigan v. Sitz,162 the Supreme Court held that suspicionless sobriety checkpoints do not violate the Fourth Am endment. 163 Under this program, drivers who were processed at a
sobriety checkpoint that were suspected to be under the influence of
alcohol were arrested and prosecuted for driving under the influence
of alcohol. 164 This is another instance where the Court upheld a suspicionless seizure that ultimately led to arrest and prosecution. 165
Similarly, the Court has admitted evidence against a defendant that
was obtained pursuant to a suspicionless administrative search. 166 In
New York v. Burger, the Court upheld an administrative search of the
defendant's junkyard made pursuant to a state statute. 167 During the
search of the junkyard, police officers found stolen property.l68 Burger was arrested and charged with possession of stolen property.169
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that "[we do not]
think that this administrative scheme is unconstitutional simply because, in the course of enforcing it, an inspecting officer may discover
evidence of crimes, besides violations of the scheme itself."170 Furthermore, the Court noted in Burger that "[s]o long as a regulatory
scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.
165.
166.

167.
168.
169.
170.

See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Griffin, 483 U.S. 868; T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
489 U.S. at 621 n.5.
[d.
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
[d. at 455. The Court articulated a three-factor test to determine whether
temporary seizures at sobriety checkpoints that are based on less than probable cause are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. [d. The Court
looked to the following three factors: (1) the state's interest in preventing
accidents caused by drunk drivers; (2) the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal; and (3) the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints. [d.
[d. at 447.
[d. at 45(}'57 (Brennan,]., dissenting).
See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 718 (1987) (Brennan,]., dissenting).
Police searched a junkyard pursuant to a statute that permitted the inspection of junkyards and automobile dismantlers for proper licensing and documentation relating to the origin of the dismantled automobiles. [d. at
693-94.
[d. at 708.
[d. at 695.
[d. at 695-96.
[d. at 716.
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that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself. "171
Before Ferguson, the Court never held a special needs search, or an
administrative search, unconstitutional simply because the search
yielded evidence that later led to criminal charges. 172 The Court consistently upheld such searches, as long as the ultimate goal of the
search was beyond the normal scope of law enforcement. 173 Ferguson,
however, takes a different approach. 174
3.

Ferguson and the Immediate Objective Approach

In Ferguson, the Court devoted extensive time discussing whether
the presence of ordinary law enforcement techniques would, borrowing the Court's words from Skinner, "impugn the administrative nature
of the ... program."175 The Court was divided with Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg in the majority, Justice Kennedy concurring, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting.
The majority focused on the immediate objective of collecting evidence rather than the ultimate goal of protecting the health of pregnant mothers and unborn children. 176 The majority reasoned that
the immediate objective of MUSC's drug testing program was to gather
evidence of pre-natal cocaine use, even though it was done to serve
some broader social purpose.1 77 The majority reasoned that all law
enforcement is meant to serve some ultimate higher social objective,
and looking to that social objective rather than the immediate objective would place all searches under the special needs doctrine. 178
This argument is convincing, but is inconsistent with prior special
needs case law. As Justice Kennedy argues in his concurring opinion,
the Court has always looked to the ultimate goal of a special needs
search policy.179 Justice Kennedy noted that "[t]he circumstance that
a particular search, like all searches, is designed to collect evidence of
some sort reveals nothing about the need it serves."180 In other words,
171. [d. at 717-18.
172. See supra notes 145-71 and accompanying text.
173. But see Carmen Vaughn, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via the Special
Needs Doctrine to Prosecute Pregnant Drug Users: Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
·51 S.C. L. REv. 671, 685-88 (suggesting that the reason that the Court upheld convictions in Griffin and Sitz was because the defendants were put on
notice that they may be subject to arrest, whereas in Ferguson, there was no
notice of the possibility of arrest).
174. See infra Part III.C.
175. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5.
176. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83.
177. See id. at 83-85.
178. See id. at 84.
179. See id. at 86-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180. [d. at 87-88 (Kennedy, j., concurring).
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the state is using the search to serve an underlying interest. 181
Whether that evidence is used for prosecution, or for administrative
purposes, is a separate issue not raised by Justice Kennedy in his
concurrence. 182
Justice Kennedy points out that the majority should have followed
previous holdings in special needs cases and examined the search policy's ultimate goal; instead, the majority only analyzed the search's immediate purpose obtaining evidence. 183 For example, in Acton, this
analysis would erroneously conclude the state's special need to be the
immediate purpose of obtaining evidence of student-athlete drug
use. 184 Rather, the court determined the program's ultimate goal to
be deterrence of student drug use. 185 Similarly, the majority's holding
in Ferguson would have led the Court in Von Raab to conclude that the
U.S. Customs Service's special need was to obtain evidence of its
agents' drug use, rather than the Court's actual interpretation that
the special need was to avoid the dangers of having drug abusers in
sensitive government positions. 186 Despite disagreement over the majority's analysis, Justice Kennedy concurred with the result because
MUSC's policy had substantial law enforcement involvement from its
inception. 187
The dissent pointed out that law enforcement involvement has
never rendered a special needs search invalid. I88 For support, the dissent relies on Griffin. 189 The majority tries to distinguish Griffin by
claiming that probationers have a lower expectation of privacy than
ordinary citizens. 19o As Justice Scalia points out, this is irrelevant to
the issue of law enforcement involvement and the scope of the special
needs. 191 Under special needs analysis, the only time the probationer's diminished expectation of privacy becomes relevant is in the
second prong of special needs analysis-balancing the interests of the
state versus the privacy interests of the individuals. However, the second prong of the analysis is only reached if the state can first prove it
has a need that fits within the scope of the special needs doctrine.
Therefore, the majority's reasoning would dispose of Griffin before
even balancing the state and individual interests.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id. 532 at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 86-87 (Kennedy, j., concurring).
[d. See generally Acton, 515 U.S. 646.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 661-62).
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666, construed in Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87 (Kennedy, j.,
concurring) .
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, j., concurring).
See id. at 100 (Scalia, j., dissenting).
[d. at lOO-Ol (Scalia, j., dissenting).
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15.
[d. at 101 (Scalia,j., dissenting).
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The dissent also looks to mandatory disclosure laws to support the
use of law enforcement in a special needs search policy. Many states
have mandatory disclosure laws that compel doctors, psychologists,
and other professionals to report certain types of information that is
obtained incidental to treatment. 192 The information obtained by a
physician often results in arrest. 193
4.

Reconciling the Immediate Objective Approach Articulated in Ferguson with Prior Cases

These competing views can be resolved by Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Ferguson. 194 Justice Kennedy pointed out that
courts have always looked to the ultimate goal of a special needs case,
rather than the search itself.195
First, prior cases have upheld arrests and prosecutions that arise
from evidence obtained incidental to special needs searches. 196 Second, the immediate objective analysis is inconsistent with prior
rulings. 197
Instead, the Court should look to whether the law enforcement involvement is incidental, rather than integral, to the ultimate goal of the
special needs policy.198 If the law enforcement involvement is merely
incidental, courts should proceed with balancing the interests of the
state against the privacy rights of the individual to determine whether
the special needs search is reasonable. If the law enforcement involvement is an integral part of the special needs search policy, the court
should find that the state's interest does not fit within the special
needs doctrine. Accordingly, any search that does not fit within the
special needs doctrine must satisfy the probable-cause warrant requirement to be found constitutional.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id. at 100 (Scalia,j., dissenting).
See id. at 80-8l.
See id. at 86-87 (Scalia, j., dissenting).
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87-88 (Scalia, j., dissenting).
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.C.3.
See id. at 101 (Scalia,]., dissenting). Justice Scalia briefly mentions this notion of incidental law enforcement versus integral law enforcement when
he is paraphrasing what he believes to be the rationale of the majority. See
id. (Scalia, j., dissenting).
The majority wrote on this matter the following:
While state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a duty
to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they
inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they
undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients Jor the specific
purpose oj incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation
to make sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require.
Id. at 84-85.
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This approach would discard the Ferguson majority's immediate objective analysis. 199 But this approach is consistent with the majority's
intent to keep special needs cases beyond the scope of ordinary law
enforcement. 2oo Additionally, this approach is consistent with prior
cases that look to the ultimate goal of the special needs policy, rather
than the immediate objective? the search itself. 201
Focusing on incidental, as opposed to integral, law enforcement is
also consistent with the mandatory disclosure laws the Ferguson dissent
calls into question. 202 Doctors and other professionals do not conduct
their examinations with the express purpose of obtaining evidence. 203
Nonetheless, there are Laws compelling these professionals to disclose
such evidence to authorities, even if prosecution ensues. 204 Likewise,
when a state creates a program in which the administrators of a special needs search take steps to administratively correct the problem
that it is seeking to prevent, and law enforcement officials adopt legitimate methods of obtaining the evidence after-the-fact, then the policy
should be upheld under the special needs doctrine. 205
IV.

CONCLUSION

Deciding whether the state can depart from the Fourth Amendment probable cause-warrant requirement206 is a serious constitutional concern, and it requires a consistent body of law. The Fourth
Amendment is a cornerstone of our legal system and any relaxation of
this restraint on government action should be scrutinized. Recognizing, however, that the Fourth Amendment only protects individuals
from unreasonable searches, the Supreme Court has upheld departures
from the probable cause-warrant standard in several situations,207 in199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

204.
205.

206.
207.

See supra Parts II.D and III.C.
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79.
See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 100 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 80-81. The Court wrote that" [Physicians or psychologists, in the
course of ordinary medical procedures aimed at helping the patient herself, come across information that uqder rules of law or ethics is subject to
reporting requirements, which no one has challenged here." Id.
See id.
In his concurring opinion in Ferguson, Justice Kennedy articulated similar
criteria in the context of the drug tests conducted by MUSC. See Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 90 (Kennedy,]., concurring). Justice Kennedy reasoned that if
the medical professionals adopted counseling or other methods of helping
the patients, and prosecuting authorities adopted legitimate methods of obtaining evidence after-the-fact, then this testing scheme would properly fall
under the special needs doctrine. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (holding that a police officer may temporarily
detain and conduct a limited search based on articulable suspicion, a standard that is lower than probable cause).
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eluding cases where the state is pursuing a special need beyond the
scope of ordinary law enforcement. 208
The special needs doctrine accommodates these special interests of
the state. 209 Notwithstanding any criticism of the legitimacy of the
doctrine as a whole,210 a problem arises when courts are left to determine the scope of state interests that fall under the special needs doctrine. 211 Recently, in Ferguson, the Supreme Court confused this
doctrine by looking to the immediate objective of a special needs
search, holding that the use of ordinary law enforcement placed the
search policy outside the scope of the special needs doctrine. 212
The Court's holding in Ferguson can be reconciled with prior cases,
as well as the concurring and dissenting opinions of that case. 213 To
accomplish this, courts must first decide whether the state's need falls
within the scope of the special needs doctrine. In making this determination, courts should examine: (1) whether the need serves a purpose other than ordinary law enforcement; (2) whether the need is
important; and (3) whether the need is in response to an actual
threat, or imminent danger would ensue if the threat materializes. 214
Additionally, the presence of ordinary law enforcement methods in
a special needs search should not necessarily render the search unconstitutional. 215 Instead, courts should look to whether the law enforcement is an incidental, rather than integral, part of the special
needs policy.216 Finally, courts should look to the policy's ultimate
goal, rather than its immediate objective of collecting evidence. 217
This analysis is consistent with the existing body of law prior to Ferguson and strikes the proper balance between individuals' privacy rights
and the states burden of maintaining public safety.
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